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1. INTRODUCTION
First we should like to thank the editor for al-
lowing us to respond to interesting discussions from
the discussants, Molenberghs, Kenward and Verbeke
(MKV), Louis and Meng, for the effort they have
put into their replies, and for the many important
points that they have raised.
We view statistics as comprising relationships be-
tween models and data, where a statistical model is
a formal mathematical formula which in some sense
represents the patterns in the data. It represents a
tool underlying the process of “making sense of fig-
ures.” There are two processes linking models and
data. The first, which we term the forward process,
can be written as
model−→ data.
This stands for, “given a model, what would the
data that it generates look like?” We call this pro-
cess statistical modelling and it forms the basis of
probability theory. The second process, which we
term the backward process, can be written as
model←− data.
This stands for, “given data, and a (guessed) model
what can we say about the parameters in that
model?” We call this process statistical inference,
and it is displayed in Efron’s (1998) triangular di-
agram for 21st-century statistical research, involv-
ing the three schools, Fisherian, Bayesian and Fre-
quentist. The process of inference involves two pro-
cedures, namely model fitting and model checking.
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In the first we find values for the parameters in the
model that fit the data best, and in the second we
use probability theory to check whether the fit and,
therefore, the assumed model is acceptable, by look-
ing at the distribution of a suitable badness-of-fit
statistic. Model checking could lead to a new model
involving the two processes.
Among the discussants, MKV seem to suggest that
data contain information only about the parameters
in the marginal likelihood, but not about the unob-
servables (random effects) in the h-likelihood. Louis
and Meng say that extended likelihood such as h-
likelihood does indeed carry information about the
unobservables, but that nevertheless the Bayesian
approach is best suited for such inferences. We hope
to show how the ideas can be combined together in
the h-likelihood framework to give a new type of
statistical inference. We shall try to make clear the
inferential status of our framework.
The Bayesian framework is a well-defined mathe-
matical structure about which theorems can be proved.
However, it requires a statement of subjective prior
belief about the unknown parameters which we are
unable to provide. Of course many attempts have
been made to define “objective” priors, but we be-
lieve them not to have been successful. As Barnard
(1995) used to stress, in scientific inference the aim
is to look for objective conclusions that scientists
can agree upon. Senn (2008) puts it more strongly
when he writes, “In fact the gloomy conclusion to
which I am drawn on reading de Finetti (1974) is
that ultimately the Bayesian theory is destructive
of any form of public statistics.” An alternative de-
scription is that we are looking across data sets
for significant sameness, structures that remain un-
changed when external conditions vary, a view which
has been strongly propagated by Ehrenberg (1975).
Another problem of using priors on parameters is
that however many data are collected, no informa-
tion is added regarding the parameters in the prior.
In contrast to the many possible priors in Bayesian
framework, in our system there is only one corre-
sponding prior likelihood (Pawitan, 2001) for pa-
1
2 Y. LEE AND J. A. NELDER
rameters, namely L(θ) = 1, and as data grow in-
formation is accumulated on all parameters in the
model. Model checking is a vital part of inference
and we regard accumulated information as neces-
sary for model checking to be effective. Science is an
entirely open-ended procedure, and there can be no
possibility of assigning probabilities to all the mod-
els we have not thought of yet.
Louis says that our paper is, “more of an opinion
piece than a scientific comparison of approaches.” In
fact, we see no fault in presenting an opinion piece;
indeed, the title itself should prepare the reader for
what follows. We have indeed carried out extensive
simulations with a wide variety of data comparing
our estimates with those of other methods, and so
far h-likelihood estimates have been often uniformly
better in terms of mean-square error. Some of these
comparisons may be found in Lee, Nelder and Paw-
itan (2006). We think our solution to mending the
plug-in empirical Bayesian (Carlin and Louis, 1996)
method is more straightforward than that of Louis
which requires yet another level of priors. We have
used the Laplace approximation when explicit ex-
pression for integration is not available. It seems
to work well in problems involving unobservables,
except for a few extreme cases where second-order
Laplace approximations are required. We support
the view that, “the art of applied mathematics is to
know when to approximate.”
Louis seems to regard our paper as over-promotion
of h-likelihood, but maybe that is because we are
highly enthusiastic about h-likelihood. In the paper
we do in fact make scientific comparisons as opposed
to the typical Baysian, who rarely makes compar-
isons with other approaches. As we shall discuss in
Section 4, with a Bayesian model, the h-likelihood
is equivalent to the Bayes posterior so there is no
disagreement in the case of a Bayesian model (see
Bjørnstad, 1996 for more discussion). We try to give
a unified framework for statistical methods devel-
oped by the three schools, but in our approach we re-
gard a fixed parameter as simply unknown so that it
differs from efforts of unification from the Bayesian
side (Box, 1980; Little, 2006).
We shall now respond to the discussants by topic
instead of responding to individual contributions.
2. LP, MODEL CHECKING AND MODEL
CHOICE
The likelihood principle (Birnbaum, 1962) pro-
vides a very good reason for using likelihood for in-
ferences, but it does not show how this should be
done. We have shown over the last 15 years how to
do so. One drawback of LP and likelihood meth-
ods in general is that they do not tell us what to
do when the model in use is not right. Suppose
that we have a random-effect model. If the model is
right the standard sandwich standard error estima-
tors can be made from the marginal likelihood. How-
ever, we can have another sandwich estimator from
the h-likelihood which is useful when the homogene-
ity assumption on the variance of random effects is
violated (Lee, 2002). H-likelihood also shows how to
reduce the bias of the ML estimators in frailty mod-
els with nonparametric baseline hazards (Ha, Noh
and Lee, 2010).
MKV claim that inferences about unobservables
cannot be made because they are not identifiable.
This is not so. Unobservables can change their sta-
tus to fixed unknowns once the sample has been
observed, as we shall discuss in Section 6.2. Thus in
principle unobservables can be estimated and model
assumptions can be checked after the data have been
collected. However, unobservables occur in various
forms, for example, as a random effect or as a miss-
ing datum. One cannot extract any information about
the latter from observed data while this can be done
about the former. Thus for the latter, model check-
ing based on observed data is not possible.
However, model checking is very important. We
have shown that the distributional assumptions on
the random effect can be checked, and have devel-
oped various model-checking procedures and criteria
for model selection. Suppose we have two different
random-effect models,
yi = xiβ +Wiw+ ei and yi = xiβ +Uiu+ ei,
which lead to the same marginal model. The two
models could have different numbers of random ef-
fects. For each model the assumptions about the
random effects can be checked by the model-checking
procedures given in Lee, Nelder and Pawitan (2006).
If the assumed model is correct we can give esti-
mates for each random component. However, the in-
dividual random-effect estimators of the two models
cannot be matched. Nevertheless, Lee and Nelder
(2006) show that the two models, if equivalent, give
the same inferences for equivalent quantities, for ex-
ample, that Wiwˆ= Uiuˆ, giving the same predictions
for the data, yˆi(w) = xiβˆ+Wiwˆ = yˆi(u) = xiβˆ+Uiuˆ.
Now suppose that they lead to the same marginal
model for y, but give different predictions for the
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data, yˆi(w) 6= yˆi(u). Then a model choice can be
made from the deviances
D(w) =
∑
{yi − yˆi(w)}
2
and
D(u) =
∑
{yi − yˆi(u)}
2,
whereD(w) 6=D(u). These deviances are constructed
from the conditional likelihood fθ(y|v) (see Lee and
Nelder, 1996 and Lee, Nelder and Pawitan, 2006,
Chapter 6.5). We, like Bayesians (Spigelhalter et
al., 2002) use the so-called deviance information cri-
terion (DIC) based on its degrees of freedom (see
Ha, Lee and MacKenzie, 2007 and Vaida and Blan-
chard, 2005 for more discussion). MKV seem to re-
gard two models as equivalent if they lead to the
same marginal model. How can the two models with
different predictions be equivalent? Consider a one-
way random model (M1) leading to a marginal mul-
tivariate model with composite symmetric covari-
ance structure (M2). They cannot be the same model
because they give different predictors. The former
(M1) exploits the covariance structure to give a bet-
ter prediction. Regardless of how the data are gener-
ated, if the covariance structure is composite a sym-
metric one-way random model gives a better pre-
diction than that based on the common mean of the
marginal model (M2). The random-effect model is
in fact an advancement on the marginal model be-
cause it shows how to predict. Various time series
models and spatial models have been proposed in
this respect.
Suppose that the unobservables v are missing data
ymis. Let yˆi(R) and yˆi(NR) be the predicted values
of the missing data under missing at random (MAR)
and missing not at random (MNAR), respectively.
The deviances are then
D(R) =
∑
{yi − yˆi(R)}
2
and
D(NR) =
∑
{yi − yˆi(NR)}
2.
Now suppose that the two missing mechanisms, MAR
and MNAR, give the same predictions for the ob-
served data while giving different predictions for the
missing data. Then we have
D(R) =A+
∑
{ymis,i − yˆmis,i(R)}
2
and
D(NR) =A+
∑
{ymis,i− yˆmis,i(NR)}
2,
where A =
∑
{yobs,i − yˆobs,i(R)}
2 =
∑
{yobs,i −
yˆobs,i(NR)}
2. In this case we cannot make a model
choice based upon the deviance because both ymis,i
and their predictors are based upon the model as-
sumptions for the missing data. Even though
yˆmis,i(R) 6= yˆmis,i(NR) we cannot observe ymis,i to
evaluate them. In this case, given only the observed
data, sensitivity analysis can be used to show how
inferences about yˆmis,i(R) and yˆmis,i(NR) vary as
the model for the unobservables changes. However,
we may never be able to draw any conclusions from
the analysis because we do not have the data ymis,i
to check our thinking. We are also unable to say
that we have checked for all the possible ways about
which our thoughts may be wrong.
We agree that care is necessary, as MKV say, but
something can still be done about inferences for ran-
dom effects of the observed data.
3. NONPARAMETRIC, SEMI-PARAMETRIC
MODELS AND GEE
It is not always easy to check all the assumptions
of a given model. For example, with binary data it is
hard to check the distributional assumption about
the random effects. In semi-parametric frailty mod-
els with nonparametric baseline hazards we can re-
lax the specification of probability models on cer-
tain parts of the model. However, this differs from
the lack of a probability basis, such as is shown in
some GEEs. In a given semi-/nonparametric model,
there are many classes of submodels which belong
to the model. It is not correct that estimating equa-
tions such as the quasi-likelihood estimating equa-
tions (father of GEE) satisfy only the first two mo-
ment (or minimal) conditions; Lee and Nelder (1999)
showed that they satisfy all the higher cumulant
conditions of a GLM family if it exists for the given
mean and variance relationships. We have demon-
strated that the estimating equations implicitly im-
pose assumptions about the higher cumulants, so
that a choice can be made depending upon the ro-
bustness of model misspecifications. We are not
against the use of GEE when it has a proper model
basis. However, its claimed advantage of less sensi-
tivity to model assumptions results from not com-
paring like with like.
In HGLMs, the distribution of random effects can
be relaxed to give nonparametric ML estimators
(Laird, 1978). Parameter estimates from binary
GLMMs can be sensitive to the distributional as-
sumptions of the random effects. A solution to this
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is to allow heavy-tailed distributions for the ran-
dom effects, to give a robust analysis (Noh, Pawitan
and Lee, 2005). Thus various parts of the model as-
sumptions in HGLMs can be relaxed to produce new
nonparametric or semi-parametric models. Ha, Noh
and Lee (2010) show that in semi-parametric frailty
models h-likelihood extends the partial likelihood of
Cox (1975) to produce new efficient estimating equa-
tions.
4. APHLS VERSUS MARGINAL POSTERIORS
Louis and Meng both say that our adjusted profile
h-likelihood (APHL) in Section 3.2 is a Laplace ap-
proximation to their marginal posterior. This is not
true because it can also eliminate fixed unknowns.
Consider the h-likelihood,
h= h(θ, v) = log fθ(y|v) + log fθ(v) = log fθ(y, v)
= log fθ(y) + log fθ(v|y).
Bayesian models are composed of two objects, namely
the data and unobservables; θ is not fixed unknown,
but unobservable. Thus their model is
B = h+ logpi(θ),
where h= log f(y|v, θ)+ log f(v|θ). Thus the Bayes-
ian framework eliminates θ by integration, even with
the use of the improper prior pi(θ) = 1.
Suppose that all θ are indeed unobservables with
a known distribution pi(θ). Then the extended LP
says that B carries all the information about un-
observables (θ, v). In such a case the Bayesian ap-
proach gives suitable statistical inferences, and the
Bayesian and h-likelihood inferences are equivalent.
But, suppose that θ represents fixed unknown pa-
rameters, rather than unobservables. As Meng says
there is no truly noninformative prior, at least for
continuous parameters. This means that for infer-
ences about parameters, use of the Fisherian likeli-
hood would be suitable. To eliminate nuisance pa-
rameters we could use profiling, conditioning or piv-
oting methods, as developed by Fisherian and fre-
quentist schools. Fisher (1934) shows that
log fθ(θˆ|A)∝m(θ)−m(θˆ),
wherem(θ) = log fθ(y), θˆ is the ML estimator and A
is an ancillary statistic. A wonderful generalization
of Fisher’s work (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1983) gives the
so-called magical formula,
log fθ(θˆ|A)∝m(θ)−m(θˆ) +
1
2
D(m,θ),
where D(m,θ) is defined in Section 3.2 of the main
paper.
Let θ = (ξ, τ) with ξ being the nuisance parame-
ters and τ being the parameters of interest. Suppose
that ξ and τ are orthogonal parameters. Because the
ML estimator is asymptotically sufficient, using the
magical formula, we can eliminate the nuisance pa-
rameter ξ from the marginal likelihood,
log fθ(y|ξˆ,A) = pξ(m; τ),
where pξ(m; τ) is defined in Section 3.2 of the main
paper, giving the Cox-Reid (1987) adjusted profile
likelihood. This formula happens to be the same as
the Laplace approximation, integrating out ξ. But it
is actually using the Fisherian method of condition-
ing out the fixed parameters. This adjustment im-
proves the profiling method (Lee, Nelder and Paw-
itan, 2006). We note that the elimination of pa-
rameters and unobservables can be carried out in
a uniform formula (APHL) which eliminates un-
observables by integration (as with the Bayesian
approach) and parameters by conditioning or (ad-
justed) profiling. Thus our APHL is quite different
from the Bayesian marginal posterior. We believe
that the prior on fixed parameters is informative
if the APHL and marginal posteriors differ. In our
framework we use profiling, modified (or adjusted)
profiling, or pivoting, as developed by the likelihood
school, to eliminate nuisance fixed parameters while
we use integrating-out techniques, as developed in
the Bayesian school, to eliminate unobservables. Our
technique, among other things, extends REML from
normal models to the GLM class.
5. HOW TO USE THE H-LIKELIHOOD
Clearly Meng understands how to form the h-
likelihood for inferences. Most complaints are caused
by misunderstandings about how to use the likeli-
hood for statistical inference.
5.1 Neyman–Scott Problems and Nuisance
Parameters
When the number of nuisance parameters increases
with the sample size, the ML estimators, jointly
maximizing nuisance and parameters of interest to-
gether, can give seriously biased estimates (Neyman
and Scott, 1948). Similarly joint maximizations of
the h-likelihood provide seriously biased estimates,
as Little and Rubin (1983) have shown. However,
if we maximize an appropriate APHL we can avoid
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such problems (Lee, Nelder and Pawitan, 2006, Chap-
ter 4). When the number of nuisance parameters in-
creases with the sample size, the profile likelihood is
often not satisfactory, and APHLs have been devel-
oped for such cases. Yun, Lee and Kenward (2007)
showed that Little and Rubin’s (1983) complaints
can be resolved by using appropriate APHLs.
Lee, Nelder and Pawitan (2006) highlight the main
philosophical difference between completed-data like-
lihood for the EM method and the h-likelihood. In
the former missing data are treated as unobserved
data, while in the latter they are nuisance parame-
ters so that the technique developed for parameter
handling can be used for the efficient imputation
of missing data (Kim, Lee and Oh, 2006). We have
found that the h-likelihood may give very good im-
putation even up to 95 percent missingness while the
EM method suffers from a slow convergence and dis-
torted results with over 30 percent missingness (Lee
and Meng, 2005). We believe that our methods will
lead to great improvements in the handling of miss-
ing data.
5.2 Invariance for Parameter Estimation and
Cauchy-Type Distributions
MKV complain that the likelihood method gives
point estimates with undefined variance. Suppose
that y follows an exponential distribution with the
log-likelihood m=− logλ− y/λ. The ML estimate
for λ is λˆ= y. Here the observed Fisher information
is I(λˆ) = (−1/λˆ2 + 2y/λˆ3) = 1/λˆ2 which gives the
correct variance estimator for λˆ. However, the ML
estimate of 1/λ is 1/y whose moment does not ex-
ist so that its variance estimator from the likelihood
theory could be seemingly meaningless. The ML es-
timators are invariant with respect to any transfor-
mation. When the sample sized is fixed, ML estima-
tors may have scales where their moments do not
exist. Let θ = δ/ϕ in equation (20) of the MKV dis-
cussion. Then yk is the ML estimator for θk with a
finite variance, for example, when 0≤ k < 1/2. The
concept of variance may not be a useful measure of
uncertainty in the ML estimator once the data are
given. Whole likelihood curves or some feature of
it such as the curvature would be useful (Pawitan,
2001); see more discussion below.
5.3 Invariance for the Estimation of
Unobservables and Exponential Model
Meng points out that consistency theory may not
be applicable to estimators for unobservables. It has
been one of the aims of the development of h-likelihood
procedure to overcome such difficulties. In our frame-
work we use the marginal ML estimators for fixed
parameters whose invariance is well established. To
maintain such invariance for unobservables we fix
the scale of unobservables in defining the h-likelihood
and use the mode for inferences. The sample mean
cannot maintain the invariance with respect to trans-
formation of unobservables while the mode does.
Because we are using the mode to derive point es-
timates for unobservables, its scale is important in
defining the h-likelihood if we are to have good infer-
ential properties. We appreciate that Meng gives a
good theoretical contribution in deciding that scale.
Another advantage of the mode estimator over the
sample mean is that it also allows one to do model
selection (Lee and Oh, 2010) instead of model av-
erage. Recently, Ma and Jorgensen (2007) have ar-
gued against the use of mode estimates for random
effects and proposed the use of the orthodox best lin-
ear unbiased predictor (OBLUP) method. However,
Lee and Ha (2010) show that the h-likelihood mode
estimation gives both statistically better precision
and maintains the stated level of coverage probabil-
ity better than the OBLUP method.
Consider the exponential model of Meng in Sec-
tion 7 of his contribution for predicting a future ob-
servation u= yn+1. In Section 7.2 he uses the right
h-likelihood h(λ, v;y) with v = logu, giving λˆ= y¯n.
Note that
uˆ(λ) = E(u|y) = λ,
which is the so-called best predictor, giving uˆ =
uˆ(λˆ) = λˆ. Now compute the following information
matrix as in (4.3):
I(λˆ, uˆ) = I(λ,u)|
λ=λˆ,u=uˆ
=


n+1
λˆ2
−
1
λˆ2
−
1
λˆ2
1
λˆ2

 .
Note that varλ(u|y) = varλ(u) =E(uˆ(λ) − u)
2 = λ2.
Thus
(−∂2h/∂u2|
λ=λˆ,u=uˆ
)−1 =
(
1
λˆ2
)
−1
= λˆ2
gives the correct estimate of varλ(u|y). From
I(λˆ, uˆ)−1 =


λˆ2
n
λˆ2
n
λˆ2
n
(1 + n)λˆ2
n

 ,
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we get the correct estimate of
varλ(u− uˆ)
2 = varλ(yn+1− y¯n)
2 =
(1+ n)λ2
n
.
This also gives the first-order approximation to
CMSE(u) = E{(uˆ(λˆ)− u)(uˆ(λˆ)− u)′|y}
= varλ(u− uˆ|y)
2 = λ2 + (y¯n − λ)
2.
The delta-method for vˆ = log uˆ gives what Meng has
for the variance of vˆ but does not provide correct
estimates for either varλ(v− vˆ)
2 or varλ(v − vˆ|y)
2.
We have shown that there exists some analogy
between inferences for the fixed parameters and for
unobservables. However, there also exist differences
between them. For a fixed constant, let say λ = 3,
we have g(λ) = g(3) for any function g(·). Such an
invariance is meaningful for an estimator of an un-
known constant and can be achievable by consis-
tency of ML estimators for fixed unknowns. Sup-
pose that we are estimating E(u|y) of unobservable
u. Then, in general
E(g(u)|y) 6= g{E(u|y)},
with equality holding only if g() is a linear function.
Lee and Nelder (2005) showed that maintaining in-
variance of inferences from the extended likelihood
for trivial re-expressions of the underlying unob-
servables leads to the definition of the h-likelihood.
Once the data are observed we treat the unobserv-
ables such as random effects as fixed unknowns as
discussed in the next Section so that we maintain
g(uˆ) = ĝ(u) for any function g(·). However, the in-
terpretation of the maximum h-likelihood estimator
as Ê(u|y) holds only on a particular scale u.
5.4 Invariance for Parameterization and ML
Estimation
In Bayarri’s example, yk is the ML estimator of τ
for τ = θk. Here the consistency of θˆk fails, so that
the unbiasedness of θˆk and exact variance estima-
tor of θˆk would be meaningful properties to achieve.
Note that E(θˆk) becomes θk, and ̂var(θˆk) = I(θˆk)−1 =
(−∂2m/∂τ2|τ=τˆ )
−1 = 2k2θˆ2k becomes var(θˆk) as k
approaches zero. Thus these desirable properties can
be achievable on a particular scale of θ. The ex-
istence of such a scale is important for inferences
about fixed unknowns. For example, if there exists
an exact confidence interval for a particular scale of
a fixed parameter [let’s say (τˆ − L, τˆ + U)], then it
allows exact intervals for all parameterizations of τ
((g(τˆ −L), g(τˆ +U)) for any function g(·). A plot of
the whole likelihood curve is useful to find a proper
scale of intervals for unobservables too (Lee and Ha,
2010).
6. IS THE H-LIKELIHOOD INTERVAL FOR
UNOBSERVABLES A CREDIBLE OR
FIDUCIAL OR CONFIDENCE INTERVAL?
Suppose that we have a model for the three ob-
jects (y, θ, v) where y and v are random variables
(RVs) and θ is a fixed unknown parameter. The sta-
tistical model fθ(v)fθ(y|v) describes how the RVs y
and v are generated.
Once the data are observed as yo, where the sub-
script o stands for “observed,” yo are fixed knowns,
no longer RVs. In the Bayesian framework all un-
knowns are considered as random without allow-
ing fixed unknowns. Bayesians assume a prior for
θ, making them random variables (RVs) so that the
marginal posteriors pi(θ1|yo), pi(v1|yo), . . . etc. can be
obtained by integrating out the rest of unknowns,
regardless of whether these are fixed unknowns or
unobservables. We find it mysterious how the fixed
unknown parameters θ can change their status to
RVs, leading to a prior probability pi(θ) that gener-
ates θ.
6.1 Intervals for Parameters
Based on the likelihood Lyo(θ) = fθ(yo), frequen-
tists can derive confidence intervals for θ (random
interval for fixed unknown), and this has become
a standard procedure. However, their argument is
based on repeated sampling from the same popu-
lation (RSSP) to which Fisher objected strongly.
According to Fisher, when a scientist seriously “re-
peats” an experiment he always has in mind at least
the possibility that the population of the previous
experiment may turn out not to be the same popula-
tion from which he is currently sampling. If he really
knew the population of the new experiment was ex-
actly the same as before he would think of himself ei-
ther as enlarging his original experiment or wasting
his time. So Fisher believed that the repeated sam-
pling from different populations (RSDP) was cru-
cial in making intervals for unknowns. The Bayesian
credible interval, based upon pi(v1|yo), meets this
goal because inferences are confined to the experi-
ment of the observed data yo. Fisher tried to make
an interval for θ, the so-called fiducial interval, un-
der RSDP. But this RSDP assumption is too strong
REJOINDER 7
a requirement for his fiducial interval to be applica-
ble in general (Barnard, 1995) while the confidence
interval can be made in various contexts.
6.2 Intervals for Unobservables
The EB interval based on f(v1|yo, θˆ) has different
treatments for fixed unknowns θ and unobservables
v. However, it cannot account for the information
loss caused by estimating θ, leading to very liberal
intervals. The Bayesian credible interval based on
pi(v1|yo), while improving the EB interval a lot, can
still exhibit strange behavior as shown in Figure 4
of the main paper. Louis has suggested some other
priors to try. However, we object to putting priors
for fixed unknowns and recommend using likelihood
methods for inferences about them.
The observed data can be obtained as follows:
From the statistical model fθ(v) the unobservables
are realized (generated) as vr where the subscript
r stands for “realized.” Note the use of the term
“realized” instead of “observed” to emphasize that
they are fixed but still unknown. Then, the observed
data yo are obtained from the model fθ(y|vr). Now
suppose that we want to make an interval for the
fixed unknowns vr given yo.
For linear mixed models, Henderson (1975) shows
that the standard error estimate from the Hessian
matrix I(β, v) in (4.3) of the main paper gives an
estimate of the unconditional MSE
E{(vˆ(θˆ)− v)(vˆ(θˆ)− v)′}.
In 1996, we showed that this holds more generally
in HGLMs. This means that our proposed interval
can be viewed as a confidence interval (random in-
terval for fixed unknown) for RSSP whose proba-
bility statement is for unobserved future data. Sim-
ulation results in Section 4.3 are from RSSP. The
proposed 95 percent interval may not always cover
vr, but among 100 intervals, 95 of them are expected
to cover the realized value.
It was Booth and Hobert (1998) who showed that
I(β, v) can also give an estimate of CMSE(v) =
E{(vˆ(θˆ) − v)(vˆ(θˆ) − v)′|y0} for GLMMs with inde-
pendent random effects. This result can be extended
to nonnormal random-effect models (Lee and Ha,
2010) and the correlated random-effect models in
Section 4.3.1 (Lee, Jang and Lee, 2010). Given the
observed data, we can therefore make an interval
(fixed interval for fixed unknown) whose probability
statement is for all possible future realizations of v.
Fisher’s aim of making intervals for RSDP may be
generally achievable for realized values of unobserv-
ables.
Louis says that we cannot account for the informa-
tion loss caused by estimating the dispersion param-
eters while Bayesian marginalization can do so. In
HGLMs dispersion parameters are orthogonal to the
rest of parameters so that we do not actually need
to account for the information loss caused by esti-
mating them. In general, exactly the same method,
that is, I(θ, v), is used to account for estimating
all the parameters. The resulting interval is also
identical to Kass and Steffey’s (1989) approximate
Bayesian credible interval (fixed interval for random
unknown) with pi(θ) = 1 (Lee, Jang and Lee, 2010).
The probability statement of Bayesian interval
based on pi(v1|yo) is different from the previous two
intervals for fixed unknown. Probability statement
of Bayesian credible interval is for RV, that is, the 95
percent Bayesian interval contains the unobservable
with 95 percent probability given the data. Such a
probability statement may not be relevant to the
realized values of unobservables, but it is meaning-
ful for inferences about unrealized unobservables, for
example, inferences about future unobserved obser-
vations. Our proposed interval also allows such a
statement for future observations without requiring
priors on θ.
Our interval for unobservables could be a fiducial
(fixed interval for fixed unknown), frequentist (ran-
dom interval for fixed unknown) or Bayesian inter-
val (fixed interval for random unknown), so allowing
three different interpretations. Similarly, the APHL
can be interpreted either as an approximate condi-
tional likelihood eliminating nuisance fixed param-
eters by the magical formula or as an approximate
marginal posterior using the Laplace approximation
with pi(θ) = 1.
Louis says for nonstandard problems where the
purpose of analysis is to find the shape of the dis-
tribution for the unobservables (pi(v1|yo)), Bayesians
can offer a better algorithm using the MCMCmethod.
For such problems we agree that MCMC-type meth-
ods are useful, but the question is whether we can
do this without a subjective prior. Can we find a
solution on which all three schools can agree? Why
not consider MCMC applied to h-likelihood?
6.3 Asymptotic versus Finite Sample Properties
of ML Estimators
Justification of ML inferences has relied heavily
on asymptotic theory. On the other hand, Bayesian
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inferences are exact in finite samples, but require
the B-club fee, priors for fixed unknowns. However,
agreed or agreeable priors may hardly exist. We have
illustrated that an exact finite-sample solution for
the ML method is possible by finding a proper scale,
but that search for an exact scale cannot be an easy
task. However, a practically satisfactory scale can
be often found without much difficulty and simula-
tion results in Section 4.3 of the main paper show
that likelihood inference using such an approximate
scale can give a better finite-sampling property than
putting unjustifiable priors for fixed unknowns.
Therefore, there is a way of deriving finite-sample
likelihood inferences without paying the B-club fee.
7. THREE IN ONE
Likelihood inferences are for models with two ob-
jects, namely, the data and fixed unknowns (pa-
rameters), while the probability-based inferences of
Bayesians are for models with data and random un-
knowns (unobservables). Statistical models of recent
interest often have both parameters and unobserv-
ables. So it seems beneficial to combine the inference
methods developed by the three schools. We are glad
that Meng found pivoting to be easy and useful for
eliminating θ for his Bayesian inferences. Frequen-
tists use probability statements to evaluate the per-
formance of statistical methods. They use unobserv-
ables (unobserved future data obtained by RSSP) to
invoke probability statements. By allowing all three
objects in statistical models and inferences, we hope
to accommodate the advantages of all three schools
in a unified framework.
In discussing Lee and Nelder (1996), Smith won-
dered whether it was time to bring the “two cul-
tures” together. In Bayes’s original paper (Bayes,
1763) an example is given of balls rolled on a ta-
ble; this seems to us to be naturally expressible as
a two-stage likelihood problem, leading to the ques-
tion, “Was Bayes a Bayesian in the modern sense?”
We are very aware that the model class we con-
sider, though having a wide scope, is as yet incom-
plete, and also that there are aspects of the the-
ory, in particular on the choice of scale for unob-
servables in the definition of the h-likelihood and
on the choice of scale for exact finite-sample like-
lihood inferences, which are as yet incomplete. We
are, however, particularly excited by the contribu-
tion from Meng which seeks to connect our proce-
dures to other generally accepted statistical ideas.
We hope that the time has indeed come to bring
the three cultures together!
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